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JOHN  E.  COONS*
ROBERT  H.  MNOOKIN**
STEPHEN  D.  SUGARMAN***
INTRODUCTION
Policy-makers  want  what  is  "best"  for children,  and  they
adopt programs, laws and regulations in its pursuit.  The advo-
cates  who  lobby  policy-makers  on  behalf of various  schemes
argue  that  they  will  help  children  flourish,  and  they  spend  a
great  deal  of  time  and  money  to  persuade  legislators  and
bureaucrats  to agree with them.  These claims are often in con-
flict.  Nevertheless,  policy-makers  tend  to take them  seriously;
indeed,  they often  see it as their core  responsibility  to decide
which  of the  competing advocates  is  right.
This,  however,  can put  the cart  before  the  horse.  Often
the first  question should  not be "what  is  best for this  class  of
children?"  but  instead  "who  should  decide what  is  best?"  Put
differently,  when  confronted  with  a  problem  concerning  the
well-being  of children,  the  policy-maker  should  initially  ask:
"Is  this a problem  I should  try  to solve by legislating  the  best
answer for every child with this problem, or is the identification
of the  'best'  something that I should assign, leave,  or delegate
to someone else to determine?"  There are times when policy-
makers  can  sensibly  conclude  that  the decision  as  to  what  is
best - even for individual children  - is properly their own;  in
that event  they should act to promote the specific answer they
conclude  is  correct.  But most often their appropriate  function
in the end is  to allocate power and responsibility among others
to  determine  what  is  best.  That  is  the  central  point  of this
article.
We  realize, of course,  that many  policies  promoted  in the
name  of the  best interest  of children  are actually  intended  to
serve other interests and purposes; decision-makers  have many
reasons  to vote for or to oppose a measure besides the reasons
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given  by  its  advocates.  And  legislators  do not always  identify
their primary  motives.  But we put aside  political  concerns  to
focus  on  the  ideal  - the  way  that  public  debate  should  be
framed  were  the  sole question  what  is  in  the best interest  of
children.
Part I of this article contrasts the "what's  best" and "who
decides"  questions and provides a range of perspectives  on the
ways  in which  power  and  responsibility  for  children  are  and
could  be  allocated.  We  do  not claim  that  merely  asking  the
"who  decides"  question  provides  an  easy  path  to  the  right
answer, or that it makes policy-making easier.  We do insist that
it is  irresponsible for the policy-maker not to answer it first.
Part II highlights in quite a different way the importance of
starting  with  "who  decides."  It  explains  two  persistent
problems  that confound  the  policy-maker  who tries  to decide
directly what's best for children.  They are:  (1) the special diffi-
culty  of  predicting  accurately  thc  ultimate  consequences  of
interventions  for  children;  and  (2)  the  lack  of an  ideological
consensus about the proper policy objectives.  These problems
caution  policy-makers  against  too  quickly  resolving  the  first
question  - "who  decides?"  - by  arrogating responsibility  to
themselves  to  determine  the actual treatment of children.
We do  not argue here for any final and overall  answer to
the  "who  decides"  question.  Instead,  we discuss  alternatives.
We  emphasize  that,  because  of differences  concerning  objec-
tives or the means to reach  them, people of good will are often
likely  to  find  themselves  in  disagreement  over  the  answer.
Indeed,  one  of  the  important  reasons  for  asking  the  "who
decides"  question is that it exposes those differences.  In short,
for  now  we  will  be  content  simply  to  help  get  the  policy-
maker's job straight.  We use the term "policy-maker"  to mean
that  law-making  body or  person  who  has  authority  either  to
decide how children  shall be treated or to empower another to
make  that  decision.  Generally  speaking,  this  will  be  the state
legislature,  Congress or relevant governmental  agency but the
question can arise at any  level in  society.
I.  THE  FIRST  QUESTION:  How  SHOULD  POWER  AND
RESPONSIBILITY  TO  DECIDE  FOR  CHILDREN  BE
ALLOCATED?
It is easy to be deceived by the superficial sameness  of our
post-industrial  society,  where  so  many  Americans  seem  to
watch  the  same  TV  shows,  dress  in  similar  ways,  follow  the
same music  and  sports heroes,  visit  the same famous  nationalDECIDING  WHA T'S  BEST FOR  CHILDREN
attractions,  etc.  In fact we  are a people  diverse  in  our  views
about what is the appropriate hope for mankind.  Our disputes
over what  children  should  experience and  should  become  are
real, frequent,  and significant.
At the level of adult life in America  this pluralism helps to
maintain a set of laws  which contain  relatively  few restrictions
upon adult behavior beyond  the basics of interpersonal respect
and order, and not always  too much  of either.  Further, aside
from law, even the informal social constraints upon adults - so
important in  many societies  - are limited here because of the
ease  with  which  Americans  can  form  and  terminate  associa-
tions.  In short, for adults  the choices  of life purpose and life
style are  many.
The impact of this same pluralism upon children, however,
is  quite different,  and  that difference  is  very important  to see.
American  adults  may  largely  escape  value  imposition  and
unwanted indoctrination, but in this society - as in every other
- it is  the  values  of others  that are  experienced  by children
regardless  of their  personal  preferences.  This  must  be  so.
Adults  have  no choice but to act toward  children  in ways  that
are either paternalistic or despotic; they rule by ordered princi-
ple or by whim - but they rule.  And children, at least younger
children,  have  little  choice  but  to  have  the  values  of others
pressed upon them.  The only question is which  specific adults
should be able to do this with respect  to which  aspects  of life.
Of course,  those with political  authority  may  through  law
simply impose their personal ideas of what is best for children.
In some societies  they do so.  Such leaders may be selected  for
the very  purpose  of imposing  their private  vision of the good
including  their  special wisdom  about children.  But this  is not
the theory of government  in the United States.  In our society,
the policy-maker with his own private view of the  right answer
must first ask a different question:  How should the power and
responsibility be allocated  for deciding what's best for children
regarding  the particular  issue?
Power to decide  what is best for children  can be variously
located.  It  can  go  exclusively  to  parents,  to  children  them-
selves, to professionals of various sorts, to bureaucrats,  to "our
forefathers"  (through the Constitution),  or be kept by the pol-
icy-makers  themselves.  It  can  also  be  shared  among  these
actors in  a myriad of ways.  Only where the policy-makers  con-
clude  that  all  (or most)  of the  responsibility  should  be  exer-
cised  at  the top  should  they  cast  their lot  on the  side of one
common solution.  In all other cases, their critical function is to
parcel  out  the  responsibility  to  decide  - and  to  ensure  that
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sufficient resources are available to those deciders to effectuate
their decisions.  Parents  may  well  be  the  best determiners  of
diet,  but  they  must  have  resources  to  implement  their
judgments.
Putting the initial emphasis upon the decider instead of the
substance of the question need not involve a surrender of soci-
ety's hope to have children fare well.  To the contrary, in cases
where the policy-maker  can't sensibly  say what's  best, the only
promising  strategy is  to put in charge  someone who,  in  some
sense, might know better.
We  next  want to  clarify  this  difference  between deciding
what is best and deciding who is best by discussing the sorts of
options  available  to  policy-makers  when  they  ask  "who
decides."  We  will  emphasize  that  a  considerable  share  of
existing  policy already reflects  the latter approach.
A.  Contrasting the Two Approaches
Consider these issues commonly put before policy-makers.
Are violent TV programs  and  advertising on children's  shows
bad  for children?  Is  health care  in the  community  better  for
mentally  ill  children  than  their  institutionalization  in  remote
hospitals  with better  technical  resources?  Is  it  good for teen-
age girls to be on "the pill?"  Too often when public issues are
cast  like  this,  policy-makers  are told  in effect  by protagonists
that  their job  is  to  answer  the  questions.  We  continue  to
emphasize  that this  need not be  their role.
Instead of asking whether particular TV shows are bad for
children, the responsible statesman first should ask who should
be deciding whether or not children see them.  Rather than ask-
ing whether community mental health  care is  better than  state
institutions,  he or she should first ask who should be deciding
in what sorts of facilities mentally  ill children should be treated.
The  same  goes  for  the  question  about  the  pill.  Once  these
"who  decides"  questions  are  answered,  the  policy-maker
should  then  address  what,  if anything,  is  needed  to empower
that decider  to make,  and  take responsibility  for, the  decision
about the individual  child or class  of children.
Put  the  contrast  somewhat  differently.  Someone  holds  a
vision of what is best for children and tries to sell it.  To whom
should  he  be selling  it?  Parents?  Legislators?  Professionals?
Is his advice something for intelligent  people to consider?  Or
is  it a path to be adopted for all under legal constraint?
There  is  a  world  of difference  between  (a)  advising  a
divorcing couple to pay heed  to research that suggests that tak-DECIDING  WHAT'S  BEST FOR CHILDREN
ing joint  custody  of their  children  can  be  beneficial  and  (b)
ordering all  divorcing parents  to share custody whether or not
they  want  to.  In  one  case  it is  assumed  that  the  parents  are
supposed to decide on the child custody arrangements, and the
advocate or counsellor  is only offering an opinion;  in the other
the enthusiast insists thatjoint custody be imposed by the state.
In fact, there are a great many ways in which the power and
responsibility can be allocated in order to decide upon the cus-
tody  arrangements  of the  children  of divorcing  couples.  In
America today, legislatures  have not determined  that one cus-
tody arrangement  is  best  for children.  In  general  they  have,
instead,  assigned  to judges  a broad  power  to decide  the out-
come  according  to  what  the judge  thinks  is  in the  individual
child's best interest (perhaps assisted  by the advice of a "neu-
tral"  social worker who investigates the alternatives  and reports
to the judge about  them).  In practice,  however, judges almost
invariably adopt the solution, if any, agreed to by the divorcing
couple, thereby giving cooperative parents de facto power over
the custody decision.
Historically,  the  permutations  in  custody  arrangements
have  been  many  and  rest  upon  different  notions  about  the
child.  In the recent  American  past,  the law contained  a virtu-
ally conclusive presumption that maternal custody was best for
children.'  By  contrast,  in  the more  distant  past  (before  this
century and  for some  centuries  in  England),  it was  the  father
who  effectively  owned  the  children,  having  complete  power
over  their  custodial  arrangements.2  Today  some  American
reformers  seek  to  change the  law  to  permit  teenage  children
themselves  to determine  the  custodial  parent.'  There  is  also
significant  support  for  a  rule  in  which  custody  automatically
goes  to  the  parent  who  has  been  the  child's  "primary  care-
taker,"  while still others would prefer  to impose joint custody.
The  point here  is  that  each policy  response  represents  a pro-
foundly  different  way  of allocating  the  power  to  decide  the
child custody  question.
The  same  point can be  illustrated in  terms of the contro-
versial  issue  about  whether  adoptees  should  be able  to  learn
about their origins.  Some advocates  think it good for adoptees
themselves to be empowered, if they wish, to identify their bio-
1.  See Robert Mnookin,  Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial  Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, LAw  &  COrrTEMP.  PROBS.,  Summer  1975, at 226, 235-36.
2.  Id.
3.  In some  states, when  children  are twelve to  fourteen or older, their
choice  is  already  dispositive.  See,  e.g.,  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.  § 3109.04
(Anderson  1987  Supp.).
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logical parents.4  Many states by  contrast, divide  the authority;
they  have -enacted  matching  procedures  that  allow  birth
mothers  and  adoptees  to  register  their  wishes  to  find  each
other; once both have agreed, their contact is facilitated.5  Each
has a veto.  Other reform  proposals  would  divide the  pie still
further, requiring also the consent of the adopting parents.  We
should add that, under the  existing laws of most states, judges
have the power to decide that an extraordinary situation exists
(usually  a genetic health problem)  that justifies  the disclosure
of the identity  of the  birth mother.6  However,  for the  usual
case, the legislature itself has exercised power via a general rule
that bars the use of court or agency records in helping the birth
mother  and adopted child  find each  other.7  A  quite  different
solution would be to have individual adoption records unsealed
and sent to all adoptees at, say, age eighteen.  Once more, each
solution represents a different allocation of the power to decide
whether  it  is  good  for adoptees  to  be  able to  find  out about
their birth parents.
This  framework  may  be  applied  to  an  endless  series  of
issues, and, indeed, is already implicit in much of our law.  Var-
ious current policy solutions  can be understood only as a com-
plex  allocation  of the power  to  decide  some  important  issue.
Take, for'example, the question of teenage marriage.  In a typi-
cal  state,  above age  eighteen  the young couple  can decide  for
themselves  whether  to  marry;  below  fourteen  the  legislature
has  itself taken  the  responsibility  to  preclude  any  marriage;
between  fourteen  and eighteen,  power  and responsibility  for
the decision is jointly shared by the couple and their parents, or
alternatively  a judge  (who must  give permission)8
The same process  is  at work when advocacy  groups  (con-
servative  or liberal) argue  to governmental  bodies  that certain
television  programming  must  be  curtailed.  They  are  best
understood  as  objecting  to  the  current  regime  by  which  par-
ents,  children  and  broadcasters  decide  what  is  available  and
what  is  watched.  These  critics  want  more  power exercised  at
the top by the legislature or, perhaps, want it assigned to some
4.  This  is  the  rule  in  a  few  states  where  adult  adoptees  have
unrestricted access to their adoption records or original birth certificates.  See,
e.g.,  Alaska Stat. § 18.50.500(a)  (1992).
5.  See  ROBERT  MNOOKIN  & KELLY  WEISBERG,  CHILD,  FAMILY  AND  STATE
701  (2d ed.  1989).
6.  See  id.
7.  Id. at 700-01.
8.  See Lynn Wardle, Rethinking Marital  Age  Requirements, 22 J.  FAM.  L.  1
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board  dominated  by  rules  and  administrators  whose  values
mesh with their own.  Although these groups may invoke  con-
flicting reasons  for the claim  that current programming  is bad
for  children,  their  solution  is  cast  in  the  same  general  form.
They  would  centralize  responsibility  for  what  children  see.
There are, of course, other allocations of power and responsi-
bility available to policy-makers  that would emphasize different
theories  about who should  decide.  Government,  for example,
could  'provide  parents  "little  black  boxes"  that  would  help
them better censor what their children watch,  or - conversely
- provide children places to go like youth lounges, arcades, or
schools where  they could watch  whatever  they wanted.
B.  Some Perspectives on the Allocation of Power
1.  Starting  Points
In  one  sense,  the  three  main  competitors  for  power  are
parents, children, and the state. The state, as we have seen, can
act  in  quite  different  ways,  either  centrally  or  through  the
agents  it  employs.  But  the contrast  we  wish  to  emphasize  is
that between governmental  and  non-governmental  deciders.
We  think that most people bring  private  presumptions  to
any specific issue.  We will here call these presumptions  "start-
ing points."  Moreover,  we  believe  that  one reason  for fierce
disputes  over  children's  policy  issues,  where  the  antagonists
often seem to be talking past each other, is that opponents have
unacknowledged  and different  starting points.
Often  these  starting  points  draw  upon  broader  political
ideologies.  Those especially wary of the state seem in general
to start with a presumption  in favor of giving all the power to
the parents.  Others who fear the state are libertarians who see
parents  themselves as just another government;  they start with
the  presumption  that  children  are  to  be  treated  like  adults.
State paternalists,  in  turn, assume that  the only legitimate  pri-
vate power is that which  is  granted by the collectivity,  and  that
children  (or at least "needy  children") are  to look first to gov-
ernment  for  guidance,  help  and protection;  the  idea  of state
ownership  of children  may  be  traced  back  at  least  as  far  at
Plato's Republic.9
There are  those  too who would  claim  to have no starting
point at all and to maintain "neutrality"  as  between  child, fam-
ily  and  state.  But  even  neutrality  must  in  the  end designate
9.  For a  recent translation, see PLATO,  THE REPUBLIC  (Richard' Sterling
& William  Scott  trans.,  1985).
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some decider, and that decider will have values of his own.  So,
although  one can  perhaps  avoid  a  general  preference  among
child, family or state, whichever decider is empowered will have
a preference  for a specific  outcome.
2.  Complex Allocations
As  already illustrated  when we  discussed  age  of marriage
and other examples,  for any particular policy issue the choice is
not exclusively child, parents  or government;  subtle and com-
plex divisions of power are also possible.  This is exemplified in
the  difficult  determination  of who  gets  to  decide  whether  a
pregnant minor has an abortion.  Let us first set out three stark
positions.  Obviously,  all  the power  could  be allocated  to the
child;  hence  a  pregnant  girl,  no matter  how young,  could  be
given  the right to decide for herself whether or not to have  an
abortion.  Alternatively,  all the power could be allocated to the
pregnant  minor's  parents;  parental  consent  would  be both  a
necessary and sufficient condition for an abortion, their daugh-
ter's wishes notwithstanding.  (For most kinds of medical treat-
ment, this is the rule.) Or, the state could assume the power of
decision.  The  legislature  might  provide  a  flat  rule  either
prohibiting or requiring abortions for all minors; alternatively,
a state official  - a social worker or a doctor - could be given
discretionary  power to decide whether an abortion was  appro-
priate for a particular  girl in particular circumstances.
Decisional power in this case could also be shared in a vari-
ety of more complicated ways.  For example, obtaining an abor-
tion might  require  the consent  of both the young woman  and
her parents.  This would mean that either could veto the abor-
tion, but neither alone could insist upon it.  Some states have in
addition  tried  to  require women  to obtain  the consent  of the
father of the fetus.'"  Alternatively,  the young woman might be
given  the  power  to  decide  whether  to  have  an  abortion,  but
only after her parents  are  first  notified of her intention.  As  a
practical  matter,  this  would  give  abortion-opposing  parents
some  bargaining  chips;  although  they  would  lack  the  legal
power to prohibit the abortion, they might be able to persuade
their daughter  to  change her mind.  Another  complex  alloca-
tion, adopted in  several jurisdictions,  permits  a young woman
seeking  an  abortion  to  obtain  the  consent  of a judge  if she
wishes to keep the matter secret from her parents."  Typically,
the judge  initially  is  to  decide  whether  the  young  woman  is
10.  See  Planned Parenthood  v.  Danforth, 428 U.S.  52  (1976).
11.  See,  e.g.,  IND.  CODE.  ANN.  §  35-1-58.5-2.5(d)  (Burns Supp.  1992);DECIDING WHAT'S  BEST  FOR CHILDREN
"mature."  If so,  then  she  gets  to  have  the  abortion.  If  the
judge finds  that she is  not mature, then the judge is  supposed
to decide whether  an abortion is  in her best interests.
The  allocation of power and responsibility  for children  is
complex in  still another sense.  Although  it would be possible
to create  a  fixed  allocation  of power over  all  aspects  of chil-
dren's. lives,  in practice  what  we  find  are  different  allocations
for different  domains  - that is,  one regime  for medical  deci-
sions, another for religious training, still another for schooling,
and  so on.
3.  Formal  and Informal  Power
We recognize  that people  do not make decisions  indiffer-
ent  to  and  uninfluenced  by  the  world  around  them  and  the
views  of others.  Popular  opinion,  professional  wisdom,  mod-
em advertising,  family tradition and the like - that is, culture
generally - clearly do impact upon tastes and preferences and
on  ultimate  choices.  Only  the  most  hard-boiled  determinist,
however,  would reject the distinction between influencing  and
dictating  choices.  In doing so he would  remove himself from
the  debate  which  assumes  that  there  are  real  choices  to  be
made by state, family  and children.
Conversely,  we  are  aware  that  investing  an individual  or
family with  formal  power does  not always  assure real  choice.
Direct coercion  by others  - duress  if  you like  - or the influ-
ence of social  and economic  disadvantage  may  in some  cases
deprive  the  actor  of  practical  alternatives.  Here  the  most
important  intervention  in  general  may  be  to  empower  the
decider in  some  positive way  with  real  options.  For children,
unfortunately,  this  may  not be possible;  whatever  the  regime,
they are likely to be dominated by the adults around them.  But
advocates of children's rights  often seem blind to this easy les-
son.  They would  formally award certain  "rights"  to little chil-
dren,  under  the  merest  assumption  that  children  have  the
capacity  to  use them.  At least for younger  children, however,
the creation of "rights"  will leave the real power of choice else-
where;  and, even in the case of teenagers,  "rights"  do not nec-
essarily  add  up  to  autonomy.  Pressures  of peers,  religious
teachings,  doctors  and  abortion  clinics,  for  example,  will
strongly  influence how formal power is exercised  by  the teen-
ager deciding about abortion.  So  will her ability to pay for it.
MINN.  STAT.  ANN.  §  144.343(6)(c)(i)  (West 1989);  Mo.  ANN.  STAT.  §  188.028
(Vernon Supp.  1992).
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4.  Two Models  of Strong State Power
Strong  centralized  control  over  child  rearing  may  be
achieved  in  quite  different  ways.  One  regime  might  include
exclusive  state  schools  and  churches,  mandatory  state  youth
groups,  state run TV  (and other media  - music,  newspapers,
etc.),  mandatory feeding at state cafeterias, state assigned doc-
tors  for children,  mandatory  health  screening  at  state  clinics
and  so  on.  Of course,  such  a  regime  could  be  directed  at  a
range of rather  different  outcomes.  What  the regime  wanted
children to do (and to be) could vary enormously - as it did in
the Soviet Union Where little children with varying talents were
picked  out at an early age and tracked  into different careers.
In  this model of strong state power,  it would be  the state
policy-makers  or state assigned  bureaucrats  and professionals
who  would  be  both  making  the  decisions  and carrying  them
out.  Under  such  arrangements,  children  might  be  treated
largely  the  same,  being  subject  to  the same  diet,  health  care
and uniform, national school  curriculum.  By contrast, a simple
"best interest"  standard could locate power in the members  of
an  elite  Platonic  bureaucracy  without  requiring  agreement
among  these  decision-making  bureaucrats  on  what  really  is
best.  The state, in  short, could  empower each  of its agents  to
impose  her own  views  upon  the individual  children  who  hap-
pened  to fall to her hand.
These are not the only ways to envision a regime of strong
state  control, however.  The state might  ostensibly  leave  deci-
sions  up  to  parents  (and/or children)  and  private  institutions
but in fact leave no room for choice at all; this could be accom-
plished by coercively intervening or threatening to do so when-
ever  the  parents,  children  or  other  private  actors  choose
something inconsistent  with  a  state  dictated  solution.  Under
this model,  there might be little state  operation of the  institu-
tions which  interact  with  children.  Direct state  control would
be imposed only upon the deviants.  This approach might work
best where either  the  state requirements  are congenial  to  the
mass of private actors  anyway  (as in  a relatively homogeneous
society) or where  the punishment of deviance  is  swift and  cer-
tain (hence dissent  can  effectively  be stamped out).
5.  Broad and  Narrow  Delegation
When power  is delegated - whether to a parent or a state
official - that person's discretion  may be very broad or, alter-
natively,  may  be subject to substantial  constraints.  For exam-
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marriage is unconditional and allows  them to draw on any rea-
son  they wish in withholding their consent.  Telling a judge to
decide  which  custody  arrangement  is in  the best interest  of a
particular  child caught up in  a divorce  dispute  is also  virtually
unconstraining, so long as the judge is given no guidance about
how  "best  interest"  is  to  be  defined  and  such  decisions  are
unreviewed by  higher courts.  In these situations the discretion
granted is so plenary as  to make the  delegate with the power a
virtual sovereign  in the  relevant  field.
On the other hand, an examiner who is deciding whethera
sixteen-year-old  should  get  a  driver's  license  is  probably  far
more constrained.  To be sure,  there  is  some discretion  to be
exercised, but "what counts"  is far clearer and more objective,
and internal administrative  guidelines  and paperwork require-
ments help hold  the examiner to those criteria.
6.  State Control  v.  State Support
To advocate an important role for the state does not nec-
essarily mean  that one supposes the state to be a wiser decider
or that  one prefers  a strict  paternalism.  To the contrary,  one
can  see  the state simply as the guarantor  of the resources nec-
essary  to  the  minimum  enjoyment  of liberty.  It  may  thus  be
government's  primary role, not to direct and command, but to
provide money and/or information  that helps parents  to make
decisions  for themselves;  it can lend  its  authority  to help par-
ents control their children.  So, too, the state can use its power
to try  to liberate children  from parents.
7.  The Need  for Effective  Intervention
Although  there  may  in fact  be  great  disagreement  about
the  hour at  which  children  of a  given  age  should  be in  bed,
suppose for the moment that there were strong consensus that
9:00  p.m.  is  the limit  for  those  ten  and  under.  At  the  same
time,  suppose we  knew  that a  small  but significant  number of
parents  were  keeping  their  young  children  up  later,  either
intentionally or through indifference.  That by itself would not
necessarily  make it sensible  to impose  a legal  sanction on'par-
ents (or children) who fail to conform.  An extension of the cur-
few  laws inside  the home might carry  too  great a  price.  First,
detection  of violations  is likely  to be  spotty, thus running  the
risk of arbitrary  or discriminatory  enforcement.  Second,  even
moderately effective enforcement of the rule is  likely to be very
costly  in  terms  of both  financial  outlay  and  loss  of privacy.
Third, societal coercion as to a child's bedtime may well under-
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mine the general  effectiveness  of parents to the  net detriment
of children  - either  because  the  coerced  parents  become
demoralized  or because their resistance  leads to financial pen-
alties  or even loss  of child custody.
This  example  suggests  that  so long as children  are going
to live with  their parents, some  socially undesirable  treatment
of children by parents is probably going to have  to be tolerated
as  the lesser of evils.  Perhaps  this  helps make it understanda-
ble why  child neglect laws have traditionally been reserved  for
cases  of  immediate  and  substantial  physical  risks  to  the
children.
8.  Limits to Children's  Self-Determination
Were  children  indistinguishable  from  adults,  the general
American  solution  would let them  decide for themselves  what
is  in  their  own  best  interest,  where  this  threatened  no  direct
harm to others.  There might be roles for government in assur-
ing their empowerment.  The state might provide children with
information  to inform  their choices and might assure them the
necessary  resources  to realize those choices  in a market econ-
omy.  But these actions would be in furtherance of their auton-
omy  in  a  manner  that  is  familiar  from  policies  directed  to
adults.
The problem  is  that children are frequently too  immature
to decide what is  best for themselves.  They might sensibly be
allowed  to  select from  a closed  set  of benign choices,  but the
old  problem  remains  - who  defines  the set?  Over the  years
the child will by stages become mature enough to decide partic-
ular matters for himself.  But who decides when a child is ready
to  decide  which  matters?  Even  in  a  society  which  wants  to
empower  children,  someone  has to decide  when each is  ready
for each  responsibility.  Hence  one aspect of the who  decides
question  is  to  inquire  as  to  who  decides  when  children  are
ready to decide for themselves.  That could be parents, or pub-
lic  officials, or legislatures  (or some combination of them);  but
it can't prudently be left  to children  themselves.
II.  Two  PROBLEMS  WITH  POLICY-MAKERS  DECIDING  WHAT'S
"BEST"  FOR  CHILDREN
We  have  explained  what  we  mean  by  the  "who  decides"
question  and have suggested  why  it  is  the  first  question  to be
asked.  We  have  also  untangled  some  of the  many  ways  to
answer  it.  Now in  Part II  we will  try  to illuminate  two  impor-DECIDING WHAT'S  BEST  FOR CHILDREN
tant difficulties  or dangers  facing  those policy-makers  tempted
to decide what in fact is best.
A.  Insufficient Understanding
In order to decide whether one alternative or another best
serves  the interests  of children,  the policy-maker  must first be
able  to  predict  the  consequences  of the  decision.  Assistance
from  experts  is  often  sought  in  making  such  predictions.
Unfortunately, when it comes to matters involving children, the
expert's  power  of  prediction  often  turns  out  to  be  quite
imperfect.
To be sure,  expertise  is  sometimes  sufficient  to make the
proper  policy  choice  clear.  The  desirability  of vaccinations
against the risks of childhood disease (e.g., polio) seems a good
example.  But,  alas,  the level  of certitude  required  for such  a
decision  is  rare in the children's  policy arena.  At the extreme
are problems where there is simply no plausible expert predic-
tion.  A  prime  example  is  the  long range  effect  of television
upon children.
In some cases,  happily, expertise  can  clearly identify what
does not work.  This at least can diffuse some ill-founded policy
proposals.  For  example,  such  knowledge  could  keep  policy-
makers from  foolishly  mandating  tonsillectomies  for  all  chil-
dren.  But, the mere elimination  of one  policy alternative  does
not  solve  the original  problem;  children  will  still  endure  the
consequences  of infected  tonsils.
Often,  only  preliminary  research  findings  are  available.
These may be worse than nothing.  The temptation to seek ref-
uge  in  whatever  calls  itself  science  is  a  weakness  common  to
decision-makers  ranging  from  members  of  Congress  to
mothers-in-law.  If the doctor  says  so, that can settle it for the
uncomfortable  decider.  This  tendency  to  over-value  expert
opinion and forego  other sources  is not special to  the profes-
sion of child rearing, but it is an inescapable feature of the envi-
ronment  within  which  the  contributions  of experts  are to  be
evaluated.
Frequently, a decider (who may be state, parent or child)  is
also  confronted  with  conflicting  and  inconsistent  advice  from
experts.  There may be research which - though "sound"  - is
in a state of discord.  Experts  can disagree about methodology,
substance, or both.  Consider the battle waged in courts and in
legislatures over the issue of whether spending more money on
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education  will  increase  student  achievement.' 2  One  of  the
many contending experts may be correct, but often the decider
has  no accurate way  to settle such disputes.  In that event, the
decider  is simply  snared  in contradiction.  She may,  of course,
accept  the  opinion  of one  of the  conflicting  experts  as  "cor-
rect"  in the sense that the decision taken is consistent with that
view.  It  is  hard,  however,  to  treat  this  as  reliance  upon  "sci-
ence;"  it  is  merely  the taking  of a course  which  is  consistent
with one scientist's opinion  and inconsistent  with another's.
General  ignorance  and  conflict  among  experts  are,  of
course,  common  experiences  both in individual decisions  and
in  policy-making.  There  are  several  reasons,  however,  why
these  intellectual  barriers  are  especially  strong  where  the
object  is  children's  welfare.  One  reason  is the  need  to  make
predictions  about remote  futures;  some ideal  state of affairs  a
generation hence is the target of much intervention concerning
children.  And the crystal ball is  cloudy.  Will fluoride produce
intolerable  side effects  while it toughens  our children's  teeth?
How will the elimination of a foreign language requirement  in
school  affect the adult capacity  to relate  to other  cultures?  Is
corporal punishment the tap root of a violent adult society or a
contribution  to  civil  order?  The longer range  the prediction,
the more difficult it becomes.
This problem  of prediction  is  common  to all  policy-mak-
ing.  For  example,  it  looms  high  when  society  addresses  the
question whether conditions  at the work place must be changed
because  of the risk of a higher incidence of cancer twenty years
from  today.  A  choice  about  the  distant  future  must be made
now.  Such  choices,  however, are  especially common for those
who must decide about children.
It might be possible to learn more about the effects of poli-
cies  on  children  by  experimentation,  which,  after  all,  is  the
heartbeat  of scientific  progress.  But here we encounter  a  sec-
ond problem.  Our society has grave doubts about the extent to
which experts should  be permitted  to experiment  on children.
Unlike willing and altruistic  adults  (or dogs and planets),  chil-
dren  are  not  allowed  to  be  subjected  to  many  potentially
important  experiments;"3  experimental  science  thus  confronts
the  formal barrier  of the law of consent.  Society  is  willing to
12.  See  San Antonio  Indep. Sch. Dist.  v.  Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1 (1973);
see also John L. Coons, Recent  Trends in Science Fiction: Serrano Among  the People
of Number, 6J. LAw  & EDUC.  23  (1977).
13.  See  ROBERT  J.  LEVINE,  ETHICS  AND  REGULATION  OF  CLINICAL
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have them participate - even with parental approval - only in
circumstances  where there is little or no danger.  And the con-
cept  of danger includes  not  merely  the risk  of physical  harm
but also  such psychic  risks  as exposure  to embarrassment  and
invasions of privacy.
Still a third barrier to knowledge  is the faster and variable
rate of physical  and  mental  change  in  children.  Not  only do
children change more rapidly than adults, but they also change
at rates different  from  one  another.  Thus, what  a researcher
knows  about  the  average  child  may  be  of  limited  use.  For
example,  to steer  children into school  together by  their birth-
days on the assumption  of commonality among age  peers  can
be cutting the pattern to  fit the cloth.  This may be necessary if
the process  of making  individual judgments about children  is
too complex or beyond our administrative power, but we pay a
price.
A  related  problem  is  the  strong  shift  of  the  onset  of
puberty  toward an earlier age.  As  a result, models  of matura-
tion that fit one historical epoch  can be outmoded  in the next.
In a reversal of the traditional sequence of work and reproduc-
tion, adolescents  are  now  physically  ready  for parenting long
before  they can obtain a job that could support a  family.  It is
not  easy  to determine  a  policy  for fifteen-year-olds  when  we
have  relatively  little  social  experience  with  the  psychology  of
this new breed.
Much the same could be said of the effect  of higher infant
survival rates upon the psychology  of parenting.  Only recently
has  it become  the assumption  of parents that they  will raise to
adulthood all the children who are born to them.  This outlook
has altered the basic data of family psychology, and  society has
lost  the security of its  collective experience.  We do not know
whether  parents are  more emotionally  connected  to their chil-
dren  than  formerly  was  the  case.  Nor  do  we  know  how  an
increase  in affection  within the family might influence  the ten-
sions and pain of parents whose work separates  them from the
child.
The  intimacy of the family  is a  fourth barrier that  screens
the researcher  from  much  of the most  significant  interaction
that the  child experiences  with his parents  and  siblings.  Chil-
dren  spend  much  of their  time  within  the  family,  and  these
relationships  may  well  be  the  primary  determinants  of basic
attitudes,  beliefs,  and  behavior.  Piercing  this  veil  of privacy
imposes severe methodological demands on the expert.  More-
over,  even  when  successful  in  penetrating  the  child's  private
world,  the investigator may  find  that young children  (because
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they do not understand the object of the inquiry) are unable to
cooperate and thus facilitate the research.  The researcher him-
self may  also have great  difficulty  in understanding  the mean-
ing  children  ascribe  to  their  own  behavior  but  cannot
communicate  in  words.  This  is  a  problem  familiar  to  the
anthropologist  who  must  resist  the  temptation  to  interpret
external  behavior according to its meaning  in his  own culture.
The  physical,  medical,  and  social  sciences  have  made
important  contributions  to  children's  policy  and  they  can  be
expected  to make more.  But their task is often heroic, and her-
oism  must  not  be  mistaken  for  understanding.  The  impedi-
ments  to research  foretell substantial  and permanent  limits  to
society's  knowledge about children.  Those  who  are responsi-
ble for framing our laws and those responsible for helping indi-
vidual  children  need  to  appreciate  that  they  will  very  often
decide upon a course of action with  little or no guidance from
science about how  to achieve  the  child's  best interest.
B.  Value Pluralism
In some societies  basic values are widely shared,  and there
is  general  agreement  about  the nature of the  good  life.  The
stereotype  of China  under  Mao  exemplifies  a  society  of this
sort.  It suggests  a  consensus  concerning  the proper  ends  of
individual action.  Variations  exist, but the commonalities  dom-
inate.  A  similar  value  consensus  seems  to  mark  many  pre-
industrial societies where unchallenged custom limits the mod-
els of behavior  available to  the individual.
Where such  homogeneous  value  systems  prevail,  the uni-
formities of childhood experience  are maintained  by collective
pressures.  These  are  not  necessarily  formal  legal  structures;
the  consensus  may be  reinforced  through  positive  law  where
the state is  strong, but, where it is not, there are informal  con-
straints of a purely social character.  These may,  indeed, be the
more  effective,  being  easily  mistaken  for  the  natural  order.
More  likely, however,  the society  will link law with custom  in a
seamless web of sanctions preserving the system of normalities.
In societies  so structured there is  little question about  the
mission  and  status  of the  family;  it  is  an agent  of the  larger
order.  It  may  have  some  discretion  about  the  objectives  of
childrearing,  but  this discretion  is  trifling  in  scope,  and  sub-
stantial departures from the norm are difficult or even perilous
for the individual.
The United States is very much the polar opposite of such
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over  the  nature  of the  good  life in  ways  both  numerous  and
significant,  approaching  Madison's  ideal  of a  society  "broken
into  so many ...  interests ...  that the rights of individuals, or
of the minority,  will be in little danger from interested combi-
nations  ...  The catalogue of those incompatible interests
is  encyclopedic.  On  the  one  hand,  this  society  comprises  a
range  of hedonistic  ambitions undreamt  by a Hefner.  Where
else could  it be credibly proffered as a norm that "If you've got
your health,  you've  got everything?,"  or  a woman  be praised
because  "she  really takes  care of herself?"  On the other hand,
the same  television  that offers snake oil to the sensualist offers
brimstone  to  the  Puritan.  The  media  knows  its  people,  and
their name  is  legion.
So  it  is  throughout  the society;  famous  and lionized  indi-
viduals  enshrine  very  different  models:  Mother  Theresa  is
revered for her unselfishness  and Donald Trump for successful
greed;  Mrs.  Bush  for  supporting  her  husband  and  Cher  for
dishing hers; Reverend  Graham for preaching purity and Andy
Warhol  for  preaching  prurience;  General  Schwartzkopf  for
aggressive patriotism  and Dorothy Day for aggressive pacifism;
Jimmy Carter for his compulsive labor and his brother Billy for
his  sloth;  Bryan  because  he  believed  and Darrow  because  he
didn't;  President  Bush for heroism in war  and President  Clin-
ton for managing  to avoid  it.
These  models  translate  into conflicting  positions  on very
specific  issues  of personal and  public  morality.  Is  abortion  a
convenience,  a  necessary  misfortune,  or  the  murder  of
innocents?  There  are  many  Americans  in each  camp.  Is our
ubiquitous  pornography  a  healthy  cathartic,  a nuisance  to  be
tolerated for liberty's  sake, or  the  terminal  cancer of civilized
order?  What  is  the  ideal  for  sexual  behavior?  How  hard
should a person work?  Is intellectualism a virtue, a bore, or the
snare  of pride?  Who  are  the  moral  defectives  - the  AFDC
mothers or those who  rail against  them?  Is God  to be feared,
loved, tolerated, denied, or ignored?
Americans are also divided over what we will call their time
consciousness.  Our meaning here  can  be clarified  by  another
comparison  to Mao's  China.  There  the  common  outlook was
said  to  be future  oriented;  individuals  perceived  their task  as
one  of contributing  to  an  irresistible  movement  toward  some
vaguely defined collective social perfection of tomorrow.  Some
Americans  share  such  a  utopian  orientation.  They  see  us
14.  THE  FEDERALIST  No.  51,  at  339 (James Madison)  (Random  House
ed.,  1937).
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embarked  together upon a voyage of discovery and fulfillment.
There is some better place to be, and as a people we must steer
ourselves  and our children in that direction.
But  in  contemporary  American  society  this  collective-
futuristic  attitude competes  with  a hope for individual  perfec-
tion and  fulfillment  that  is  achievable  only  by  oneself and  in
one's  lifetime.  The  commitment  to  individual  self-fulfillment
comes in many shapes and sizes.  For some it means little more
than the achievement  of objective self-defined  secular goals  -
money,  fame,  political  reform, or fun.  For others  self-perfec-
tion  lies  not  in  external  achievement  but  subjectively  in  the
development  of character,  in the  stoic  acceptance  of finitude,
or in salvation in an eternal  order.
C.  Three Examples
1.  Baby Selling
Consider the question of whether those who want children
should be permitted  to arrange  privately  to  obtain  them from
others.  Traditionally, advocates of such a market imagined the
"buyers"  to be couples  who either could  not bear children  or
did not want to (perhaps because of reasons of health or, even,
of convenience).  They  imagined  the  "sellers"  to  be women
who found themselves  pregnant but not wanting to parent the
child.  In this imagined market, willing sellers would  give birth
to the child, surrender their parental rights, and turn the child
over to the willing buyers  for adoption - with fees  paid if the
market  so required.  This  was  all  hypothetical.  Traditionally,
such  transactions have been forbidden  by law,  and those  who
participate  in them risk criminal prosecution.'
5
Instead, the state created  a special bureaucratic  system for
matching  these sorts  of parties.  Those wanting children tradi-
tionally  have had  to  go  through  certified  public  or non-profit
adoption  channels, have their qualifications approved and have
their  child  selected  for  them.  Some  such  applicants  for
parenthood, of course, are deemed unfit; others wait for years;
still others obtain a child who isn't quite what they had hoped
for.  As part of this regime, those pregnant women not wanting
their children have to surrender them up to the adoption agen-
cies  (or keep  them  anyway, or abort them).
As  medical  technology has  changed, however,  more  com-
plicated  contractual  arrangements  have  become  possible  and
15.  See  MNOOKIN  &  WEISBERG,  supra  note  5,  at  692;  J.  Robert  S.
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plausibly  legal.  First,  an  adoption  might  be  arranged  in
advance of conception with the male of the buying couple pro-
viding  the sperm  through artificial  insemination, and  the  sell-
ing mother  providing her egg  and womb.  More  recently, the
female of the buying couple has become able in some cases  to
provide  the egg, which  is  then  implanted  in  the womb of the
seller  (or perhaps  "lessor"  is  a better metaphor).  With  these
developments  policy-makers  have  been  confronted  with
demands  that  these  forms, of "surrogate"  mothering  also  be
banned  or that  they be  allowed but  carefully  regulated  along
the  lines  of traditional  stranger  adoptions.  Conversely,  the
favorable  reception  generally  given  such  high-tech  arrange-
ments has renewed the call by others that ordinary baby selling
between biological  strangers  should no longer be forbidden.
Legal  developments  in  many  states  have  already  turned
policy in that general  direction.  "Independent"  adoption  stat-
utes have  made illegal  baby  selling difficult  to identify.' 6  In  a
typical  independent  adoption,  a  lawyer  or  other  go-between
matches  up  the  acquiring'  parents  with  a  pregnant  woman
whose care during pregnancy  (and expenses of birth) are often
generously funded  by the adopters;  they, after all, are probably
eager  for  first  lass  pre-natal  care  in  order  to  maximize  the
health of what  will be  their child.  In such  arrangements,  it is
not entirely clearjust how the adopters are selected (apart from
ability to  pay),  although sometimes  the birth mother  (possibly
with  the help  of the  father) makes  the  choice.  The  lawyer is
presumably in it for a profit, and who  is to say whether  or not
the pregnant woman is as well?  And should it matter if it were
so?
Some,  of course,  find  horrifying  the  idea  that  helpless
infants (and fetuses) would be bargained for and sold like beef.
Rather  than  legalization,  they  want  more  regulation  and
stepped up  enforcement  of existing  criminal  sanctions.  They
find  the hyper-rationality  'f the enterprise  highly  disquieting.
They  fear,  among  other things,  that  legalization  would  mean
that  most  stranger  adoptions  would  involve  contracting  in
advance for the  seller to conceive, rather than adoptions  from
women who want to deliver  their babies but-not keep them.  Is
that  likely  to  happen,  or  are  the  physical  and  psychological
costs of bearing  a child for another far  greater than the  finan-
cial  benefits  most  women  could  hope  to  gain  as  part  of  a
planned transaction?  Does  it happen much now in secret?  We
simply do not know.
16.  See  MNOOKIN  &  WEISBERG,  supra note 5,  at 692.
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Nor  is it known (or perhaps  knowable) how much harm, if
any,  is done  (or would be done)  to children  by practices  now
technically  illegal.  Are  we  to  assume  that  people  who  can
afford  to raise children, and who badly want them, abuse those
they acquire in the market?  Common experience  suggests that
people  willing  to  buy  an infant  are  likely  to  treat  him  better
than the parent who is willing to sell him.  And the child is pre-
sumably better off having been sold than aborted.  But were the
practice  made legal, is there  a genuine  risk that people would
enter "the market"  in order to acquire young "slaves?"  Or do
"child  abuse"  laws  sufficiently protect  against  this?
If parents could buy and sell without restraint - especially
if they could  transfer children  of any age - should  we not be
concerned  about  possible  psychic  consequences  to  children
when  they  become  aware  of this  possibility?  Or  does  this
merely suggest  that sales should be allowed but only until the
child  is a  year old?  (Or a month old?)
Would  the  handicapped  child  who  now  gets  adopted  be
ignored  if a  real  market  in  healthy  babies  got  going?  If so,
should the potential happiness of one group of babies be fore-
gone  because  it  is  not  available  to  the other?  Would  a  baby
market  discriminate  against  the  poor  who  wished  to  adopt?
Probably,  but would there be more or less such discrimination
than is  practiced today by adoption  agencies?  Many  think that
such  agencies  have  a  very  middle-class  outlook and  a  strong
preference  for middle-class  adopters.  If we  are  interested  in
the child's  material  welfare,  how much does this matter?
Perhaps  the biggest  barrier  to a legal  market  in  babies  is
the assumption of the media and politicians that most adult citi-
zens  object to the private transfer of "ownership"  of a human
person if any cash changes hands; somehow it suggests the idea
of slavery.  But how  widely felt is  this  alleged  revulsion?  And
could this mind-set be altered by gradual re-education?  Would
it help if it became obvious  that the private transfer of children
was a promising avenue of upward mobility for the offspring of
the poor?  These  questions are presently without  answers  and
seem likely to remain  so.
The only clear fact is  that the present rules concerning the
voluntary transfer of a child from one parent to another cannot
be  said to  rest upon scientific  findings.  For  the most part  the
necessary  knowledge  does not  exist  and  would  be difficult  to
acquire.  The  transactions  that  now  occur  and  that  scientists
wish  to  study  are shrouded  in secrecy.  And  the psychic phe-
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dicting the consequences  of a change in the law would also  be
terribly difficult.
So, too, although  it is not easy to identify a groundswell of
opposition  to  the  ban  on  baby  selling,  many  are  clearly
offended by  the ban.  Some want  to adopt but are not allowed
to; perhaps  they are  single, gays or lesbians, couples  of mixed
race  or religion,  too  old,  or  whatever  criteria  now  disqualify
them from the formal  process.  All prospective adopters are to
some  degree  injured  by  the artificial  shortage  created  by  the
law.  Surely there  would  be  more  potential  sellers  if mothers
were  allowed  to  help  choose  and  bargain  with  the  adopting
couple.  Is  the frustration  of the wishes  of these adults  in  the
best interest of children  - or contrary to it?  Is it a necessary
harm to children  that serves some greater good?  Who can say?
Disputes  over  baby selling  are fraught  with  indetermina-
cies  over  what  would  actually  occur  were  the  practice  made
legal,  and sharp value disputes  over whether the various  possi-
ble consequences  are desirable or not.  In this situation,  we do
not  believe  it  can  be  coherently  stated  that  a  legal  regime
allowing regulated  baby selling is or is  not in the best interests
of children.
2.  Required and Prohibited Reading
Although everyone  agrees that children  should learn  how
to  read,  there  is  great  disagreement  over  what  they  should
read.  Some  think all  children  should  simply decide  for them-
selves.  There  is a  practical  difficulty with  this view  because  of
the problems of access, especially for younger readers; but it is
a fairly common sentiment.  Many other people, however, have
a  list  of "musts"  and/or  categories  of "forbidden  reading."
For them the child's choice should definitely be promoted and/
or restricted.  Some would  insist that children  read  the  "great
books;"  others  comic  books.  Some believe  the Bible  is essen-
tial; for others the Nancy  Drew  series  is  the bible.
Many  communities  and  families  have  had  considerable
strife  over  the  issue of what  should  be forbidden.  Some  citi-
zens  hold  that children  should  not  be allowed  to read  or see
material  that  they  (the  critics)  consider  to  be  pornographic.
Indeed, in furtherance  of this  objective, and with the  Supreme
Court's  approval,  a  number  of  legislative  bodies  across
America  have made it illegal  to sell this  sort of material  to chil-
dren (including  books and magazines  that are not obscene for
First Amendment  purposes  and hence could  not  be restricted
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in their sale to adults).' 7  The "adult bookstore"  is a manifesta-
tion of this  kind  of censorship.
Many  bitter battles  have been  fought  in local schools  and
libraries.  In  a typical  fracas  in Island  Trees, New  York,  some
parents strongly  objected  to a number of books they found  in
the high school and junior high school libraries, after determin-
ing that these books were on a list of offending books they had
obtained.from a politically conservative parents organization.',
A committee  reviewed  the books on behalf of the Board,  rec-
ommending  retention  of some,  and disposal  of others,  while
ignoring  still others.  Exercising its  own discretion,  the Board
largely rejected the committee's recommendations  and decided
that almost  all of the books  at issue  should  be  removed  from
the  libraries,  asserting that  these books  were vulgar,  immoral
and in.bad taste and hence educationally unsuitable for the dis-
trict's  children.  The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  eventually  decided
that if the board's real motivation was educational suitability or
a  concern  for  pervasive  vulgarity,  then  it  had  the  right  to
remove the -books; but that if the Board's real motivation was to
deny children access to ideas with which the Board  disagreed,
then  the  First Amendment  barred  the  removal  of the  books
from the libraries.  The case  was then remanded  to determine
the Board's  true intentions.
Even  more consequential  than such  local  scrimmages  are
the  systems of school  textbook selection  which  operate  at  the
state  level  in large  states  like  California  and which determine
what  is  available in  the national  market.  In California  a state-
level committee  holds public  hearings on the guidelines  to  be
issued to publishers and upon the appropriateness  of the prod-
ucts they offer. 9  Selection for the short list of approved works
can be more rewarding  than winning the  state lottery.  Conse-
quently publishers are careful not to offend unions, Christians,
Jews,  blacks,  feminists,  traditionalists,  evolutionists,  creation-
ists  and a  considerable collection of other  "ists."
The result is not publicly called "censorship"  but that is, of
course, the nature of the process.  For example, in a recent pro-
tracted struggle over the question of how to treat evolution, the
17.  Ginsberg v.  New  York, 390 U.S.  629  (1968).
18.  Board of Educ. v.  Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982);  see alsoJohn E.  Coons,
Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, 4  NOTRE  DAME J.L. ETHICS  &  PUB.  POL'Y 495
(1985).
- 19.  See  David  L.  Kirp,  Textbooks  and Tribalism in  California, PUB.  INT.,
Summer  1991,  at  20-36.  For  a  general  discussion  of legal  challenges  to
textbook  selections  and the textbook  selection  process,  see  MARK  G.  YUDOF
ET  AL.,  EDUCATIONAL  POLICY  AND  THE  LAw  232-35  (3d ed.  1992).DECIDING  WHAT'S  bEST FOR  CHILDREN
evolution  side  was  ultimately  able  to  triumph  to  the  virtual
exclusion of competing explanations of species.  Yet, in a care-
fully nuanced rule, although no other theory may be presented,
the texts and the teachers  are not permitted  to teach evolution
as a fact.2"  What is interesting from our perspective  is that the
question of who should decide was largely swamped by claims
pro  and  con about  what  evidence  supported  what  theory.  It
was  in  any  case  assumed  that  neither  parents  nor  classroom
teachers  were  the proper locus of decision.
The evolution example may be untypical  because it ended
in a fairly clear victory for one view.  In many cases the curious
overall  effect of the state's  system of censorship  is that, in the
public  school  curriculum,  issues  of great  moment tend  to be
assigned to Limbo.  More than anything else the forces arrayed
in opposition  to one another generate- political  fear.  The con-
sequence  is  what we  sometimes  call  the "Vanilla  Curriculum"
- utterly inoffensive,  and challenging in like proportion.
These disputes  over children's  reading material - involv-
ing parents, teachers, librarians,  textbook committees,  publish-
ers, politicians,  interest  groups and the like  - do not  turn on
which books  best help children learn  to read.  They are rather
about what  children  shall know and  to what ideas  they will be
exposed.  In short, they are disputes about values.  As such, in a
democratic  society  how  can  it  be  said  that  there  is  a  social
answer to whether inclusion or exclusion of any particular book
is or is  not in the best interest of children?
3.  Child Care Arrangements
There is a great diversity of value-based  opinion over what
are prized child care arrangements  for under-fives.  Some peo-
ple think  young children should  stay home with  Mom so that,
among other things,  the child  will be  trained  to behave in the
ways  thought proper by  his  or her parents.  Others,  who  also
support home child care, think it crucial that Dad take substan-
tial  responsibility  for  the job so  that, among  things,  the child
gets  a "modern  view"  of sex roles.
Some  people,  on  the  other hand,  think  it  essential  that
children be cared for by someone other than a parent for a sub-
stantial portion of the week.  But reasons for such views - and
in turn the kinds of environments favored - vary dramatically.
Some  want  children  to have  one or two  other children as  inti-
mates, fostering the relation through  a small, warm and loving
20.  See Diane Curtis, State Board OKs Guidelines on Evolution, S.F.CHRON.,
Nov.  10,  1989,  at Al.
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family  day care  home.  Others  seek as  their primary objective
the exposure of children  to youngsters  of other races and eth-
nic groups.  Others  want young  children  to experience  large
group  socialization  at  either  day  care  centers  or  big  play
groups.
What  then  should  public policy  be  with  respect  to  child
care?  Should  parents  who  care  for  their  young  children  at
home  be  eligible  for  the  same  financial  benefits,  if any,  pro-
vided to those parents who turn the care of their children over
to  others  (as  Republican  Administrations  from  time  to  time
seem to suggest)?2  Such an approach might call for tax credits
or children's allowances  paid to all parents of young children.
Alternatively, should only some types  of child care attract pub-
lic  subsidy,  and  if so, which  ones?  Wealthy  people  and high
income two-earner couples often use nannies, pricey family day
care  and  formal  nursery  schools  as  their young children  age.
Should  this  be  taken  as  the  standard  for  all  children?  That
might leave out Head Start, which is widely thought  to be edu-
cationally  effective  for the children of the poor.  (Or does  this
rather  imply  that  all  children  should  be  enrolled  in  Head
Start?)
Should those  who care  for the children  of others  be  sub-
jected  to  regulation  through  licensure  requirements  not
imposed  on  parents?  If so,  on  what  basis?  The  educational
credentials  of the care givers?  The square footage of the place
of care?  Its policy on vaccinations and sick children?  The edu-
cational  and/or religious  content of its program?  Its  selection
practices?  Its fees?  How many children are cared for together?
Plainly, it is not easy to insist that any solution is in the best
interest  of children,  not only  because of differing conceptions
of the object of such  care, but also because of our uncertainty
about the positive  and negative impacts  of any  specific regime
or set of rules.  As with our other examples, policy-makers  who
would  try  to  settle  upon  a  single  solution  to  the  child  care
debate face  enormous  difficulties  in  deciding which is  best  for
children.
21.  For  a  description  and  discussion  of  former  President  Bush's
proposals,  see Julie Johnson, Child Care: No  Shortage of Proposals, N.Y.  TIMES,
Mar.  26,  1989,  § 4,  at  5;  The  Candidates on  the  Issues,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Sept.  25,
1988,  § 1, at  24;  Louis  Uchitelle,  Rival  Views  on  Economy:  To  Nurture, or to
Prune?, N.Y.  TIMES,  Nov.  3,  1988,  at Al.DECIDING WHAT'S  BEST  FOR CHILDREN
CONCLUSION
If society appears to lack a common view of whether a cer-
tain objective is best for the child, or if the most effective means
to achieve  that objective  is in doubt, what should we  as a peo-
ple do?  Such an intellectual  impasse does not take  the policy-
maker  off the  hook, for inaction  is  itself a decision.  A  choice
will  be made one way  or the other through  the private discre-
tion of the person who  enjoys  the  most effective  access  to the
individual  child  (not necessarily  the  parent).  For  this  reason,
we can attach no virtue to government inattention as such.  Pol-
icy-makers  may,  of course,  responsibly  choose  not  to  disturb
the  status  quo  concerning  children,  but  that  requires  a  con-
scious decision  in  favor of inaction.
Deciding  how  much power  should  go to children,  to par-
ents, and to public officials  is  often a difficult  question for pol-
icy-makers.  They  must  contend  with  contrasting  starting
points  rooted  in  deep  value  differences.  They  must proceed
frequently  knowing  that  they  themselves  don't  really  know
what is best.  Parents  may look  attractive  as deciders,  because
they can be expected  to have  intimate knowledge,  as well as  a
general  concern  for  their  children,  and  will  probably  suffer
along with the child when a bad decision is made.  Parents  may
provide  the most appropriate sheltering environment in which
children can be gradually empowered  and liberated as they are
ready to take on responsibility  for themselves.  And, of course,
if humanity is to have a future, we must give people some good
reasons  to  want  to  be  parents.  Yet  some  parents just don't
seem to  care;  others appear  incompetent;  still  others  lack  the
resources  to act effectively  upon choices  they would  make for
their children.
Professionals  have expert knowledge and they can provide
objective judgment.  Their advice  can, of course, be offered to
parents  voluntarily  in  a  market  exchange;  indeed,  various
experts  (from  music  teachers  to  child  psychologists)  are rou-
tinely  employed  by  parents  in  the  course  of exercising  their
own  power.  As  between  parents  and  professionals,  then,  the
real question  is when the state should empower the latter com-
pulsorily  to override the former.
Surely, every  thoughtful  person who  cares  about children
would  admit  that  a  compulsory  override  of parents  is  some-
times  desirable.  Put  most  starkly,  no  friend  of children  can
favor child abuse.  Furthermore, at some point in time we need
to override parents even in the name of child liberation.  Who
thinks  that  30-year-olds  should  have  no  more  rights  than  3-
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year-olds?  But when  and in what  domains  is  liberation  to  be
assured when parents themselves do not think the child ready?
As we have earlier demonstrated, many areas  of children's
policy already reflect  societal decisions  about the allocation  of
power.  What  we need now is  more self-conscious  attention  to
those  decisions,  more  systematic  evaluation  of  positive  and
negative attributes of those who would gain power and respon-
sibility over children in varying settings, and more open recog-
nition  of the  value  differences  that  lead  people  to favor  one
decider  over  another.  This  heightened  scrutiny  of the  "who
decides"  question  does  not  guarantee  that  better  children's
policies will actually be adopted, but it should make their adop-
tion  more  honest.  Moreover,  it  should  help  avoid  mindless
drift towards  the centralization  of power  and responsibility  in
cases  where  more  reflective  policy-makers  would  themselves
conclude  that  it  is  better  for  children  for  someone  else  to
decide what's  best for them.